Abstract. Both network managers and analysts appreciate the importance of network traces as a mechanism to understand traffic behavior, detect anomalies and evaluate performance in a forensic manner, among other applications. Unfortunately, the process of network capture and storage has become a challenge given the ever-increasing network speeds. In this scenario, we intend to make packets thinner to reduce both write speed and storage requirements on hard-drives and further reduce computational burden of packet analysis. To this end, we propose to remove the payload on those packets that hardly could be interpreted afterwards. Essentially, binary packets from unknown protocols fall into this category. On the other hand, binary packets from well-known protocols and protocols with some ASCII data are fully captured as potentially a network analyst may desire to inspect them. We have named this approach as selective capping, which has been implemented and integrated in a high-speed network driver as an attempt to make its operation faster and more transparent to upper layers. Its results are promising as it achieves multi-Gb/s rates in different scenarios, which could be further improved exploiting novel low-level hardware-software tunings to meet the fastest networks' rates.
Introduction
Traffic monitoring at multi-Gb/s rates poses significant challenges not only for traffic capturing but also for traffic storage and processing. On the one hand, traffic capture at high-speed requires either ad-hoc network drivers that incorporate sophisticated prefetching, core affinity and memory mapping techniques [3] or specifically tailored network interface cards based on network processor devices or FPGA [1] . On the other hand, once the packets have been captured, they must be swiftly transferred to hard disk at the same pace that they are received from the network.
A most important issue in traffic dumping to hard disk is packet size, the larger the packet the more prone the traffic losses and the higher the storage investments. To circumvent this issue, the packet payload is capped to a predefined snaplen size. The aim is to reduce the offered write throughput to the hard disk, which is the hard disk performance figure of merit and bottleneck. Needless to say, a large share of packets contain a payload that is useless for subsequent analysis, for example encrypted payload packets. Precisely, the motivation of this research is to drop useless payload packets, by selectively capping their length to the mere packet header. The benefit of this approach is threefold: first, the hard disk bottleneck is alleviated, since the write speed requirements decrease. Second, we reduce the storage space, which is very large for a high speed network, even if the capture duration is small. Third, the computational burden required to analyze capped packets is lower, for example the RAM memory requirements of NIDS applications, such as Snort, are less stringent. We call our data thinning technique selective capping. In more detail, we propose marking a packet payload of interest according to two conditions. First, if it is binary from a well-known protocol -i.e., if it can be interpreted by a traffic dissector. To do so, one has to identify such network services beforehand and only apply selective capping on such services, while leaving the rest untouched -e.g., using flow director filters [5] on port numbers or IP address ranges.
A packet is also interesting if it contains human readable data (more formally, ASCII, UTF-8, UTF-EBCDIC or equivalent) -which can be interpreted by a network analyst or by the application designer. The human readable, ASCII in what follows, case entails a harder work as it embraces not only all-ASCII protocols -e.g, SIP-, but protocols with both binary and ASCII interleaved parts. This is the case of HTTP for example, in which binary content (pictures, videos, etc.) is interleaved with ASCII text. Such binary content is not useful for the most performance analysis such as web profiling or HTTP server response times. Our findings show that for typical HTTP traffic up to 60% of the traffic is made up by binary content. Consequently, if the binary content could be removed on-the-fly then the hard disk input rate would be largely reduced. Similarly to HTTP there is a number of popular protocols that merge binary and ASCII which span all Internet activities. Banking networks leverage protocols such as FIX. Furthermore, routing and login protocols such as Radius and IS-IS, monitoring-oriented protocols like IPFIX and database management systems such as TNS are examples of this behavior. In the case of encrypted protocols such as HTTPS, all packet payloads are useless which motivates even more to discard them. However, it is worth remarking that encryption is not strongly present in enterprise scenarios, where monitoring is performed inside the local network and traffic is unencrypted.
Detection of ASCII packets should be as simple as inspecting the whole payload and checking if every single byte belongs to a given ASCII alphabet. However such alphabets typically encompass close to half possible byte values. As an example, ASCII encodes 128 specified characters into 7-bit binary integers which makes a random byte to fall into the alphabet range one out of two times. In this light, the following two mechanisms are proposed. The first one seeks for a set of consecutive ASCII characters on the payload, namely a run, as an approximation to the idea of a word in the natural language. The second one is based on the percentage of bytes candidates to be classified as ASCII. We have
